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1.
Yasuhito Tanaka 《Operations Research Letters》2019,47(5):406-409
We study a dynamic free-entry oligopoly with sluggish entry and exit of firms under general demand and cost functions. We show that the number of firms in a steady-state open-loop solution for a dynamic free-entry oligopoly is smaller than that at static equilibrium and that the number of firms in a steady-state memoryless closed-loop solution is larger than that in an open-loop solution. 相似文献
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3.
《Physics letters. A》2020,384(35):126904
Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment. 相似文献
4.
分析了初中化学微粒观的教学内容和“原子的结构”的相关教学设计,针对学生“微粒观”建构存在的难题,提出利用反馈机制,采用“寓教于乐”的游戏化教学设计,并进行实践效果访谈。不仅完成了本课时的教学目标,也让学生对化学的兴趣更加浓厚。 相似文献
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Marek Szopa 《Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)》2021,23(5)
Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein formalism and the Frąckiewicz–Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied. 相似文献
7.
We consider a class of noncooperative stochastic games with general state and action spaces and with a state dependent discount factor. The expected time duration between any two stages of the game is not bounded away from zero, so that the usual N-stage contraction assumption, uniform over all admissible strategies, does not hold. We propose milder sufficient regularity conditions, allowing strategies that give rise with probability one to any number of simultaneous stages. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and ∈-equilibrium stationary strategies in the sense of Nash. In the two-player zero-sum case, when an equilibrium strategy exists, the value of the game is the unique fixed point of a specific functional operator and can be computed by dynamic programming. 相似文献
8.
In this study, we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels: (i) Are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry-over effects on demand? (ii) Should firms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities? To answer these questions, we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price. The latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product, and by firms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy. 相似文献
9.
We study the committee decision making process using game theory. Shenoy [15] introduced two solution concepts: the one-core and the bargaining set, and showed that the one-core of a simple committee game is nonempty if there are at most four players. We extend this result by proving that whether the committee is simple or not, as far as there are less than five players, the one-core is nonempty. This result also holds for the bargaining set. 相似文献
10.
In the game of cops and robber, the cops try to capture a robber moving on the vertices of the graph. The minimum number of cops required to win on a given graph G is called the cop number of G. The biggest open conjecture in this area is the one of Meyniel, which asserts that for some absolute constant C, the cop number of every connected graph G is at most . In a separate paper, we showed that Meyniel's conjecture holds asymptotically almost surely for the binomial random graph. The result was obtained by showing that the conjecture holds for a general class of graphs with some specific expansion‐type properties. In this paper, this deterministic result is used to show that the conjecture holds asymptotically almost surely for random d‐regular graphs when d = d(n) ≥ 3. 相似文献